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We investigate the security against collective attacks of a continuous variable quantum key distri-
bution scheme in the asymptotic key limit for a realistic setting. The quantum channel connecting
the two honest parties is assumed to be lossy and imposes Gaussian noise on the observed quadra-
ture distributions. Secret key rates are given for direct and reverse reconciliation schemes including
postselection in the collective attack scenario. The effect of a non-ideal error correction and two-way
communication in the classical post-processing step is also taken into account.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to dis-
tribute a key between two honest parties, usually called
Alice and Bob, which is provably secure against any
eavesdropper Eve. It is assumed that Eve is only limited
by the laws of physics. From a practical point of view, im-
plementations using coherent states as input signals and
variations of homodyne [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] detection seem
to be promising, since they can readily be realized exper-
imentally. Moreover, it has been suggested that homo-
dyne detection can be performed at high repetition rates
in continuous variable (CV) QKD to boost the secret key
rate [1]. The security of these schemes has been investi-
gated before [1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] and uncon-
ditional security has been proven for losses of up to 1.4
dB [16]. Though advancing our understanding of these
schemes, no analysis has been provided that would give
an unconditional secure key over channels with higher
losses or channels imposing excess noise on the observed
quadratures. In this article we will present an analysis
that derives a security result under the assumption of
collective attacks and the observation of Gaussian noise.
The result is derived in the infinite key limit, thus ig-
noring statistical effects. Though restricted in this sense,
there are strong indications that these restriction can be
lifted, so that our results, if successfully combined with
other results will lead to the desired unconditional secu-
rity. We expect this will be a fair representation of the
(still missing) full unconditional security proof. We com-
pare different techniques of extracting a secret key from
shared classical data such as postselection (PS) and re-
verse reconciliation (RR). Moreover, our approach can be
modified to include two-way communication in the clas-
sical post-processing step of the protocol and non-ideal
error correction.
Any QKD protocol can be thought of consisting of two
phases. The goal of the first phase is to distribute an
effectively entangled state between Alice and Bob [17,
18]. This entanglement does not need to be present in
actual physical systems. Instead, it can be brought in
as a theoretical construct [17, 19], as explained in more
detail in Sec. III. In practise, Alice and Bob will use a
prepare-and-measure scheme, where Alice encodes some
bit-value i into non-orthogonal signal states. She sends
a sequence of n such states over the quantum channel
to Bob. In general, Eve might interact coherently with
these n states. We restrict ourselves here to the case
of collective attacks, where Eve attaches an independent
probe to each signal. Then the total state shared between
Alice and Bob will be of tensor product form ρ⊗nAB.
Eve, however, may keep her quantum states ρE,i,
which summarize all her knowledge about the sent sig-
nals until the second phase of the protocol is completed.
In this phase, Alice and Bob use an authenticated but
otherwise insecure classical channel to correct for errors
in their bit-strings and to cut out Eve’s knowledge about
the key (privacy amplification)[20]. The information sent
over the classical channel becomes available to Eve who
then can optimize her collective measurements on the
quantum states. For this scenario of collective attacks,
we apply the generic approach by Devetak and Winter
[21] to give a lower bound on the secret key rate.
The security analysis presented here applies to the sit-
uation where the quantum channel connecting Alice and
Bob is lossy with single-photon transmittivity η and im-
poses Gaussian excess noise δ on the quadrature distri-
butions. This kind of noise is typically seen in the exper-
iments [22, 23]. It has been shown that a distillation of
a secret key in CV-QKD is only possible when
δ < 2η , (1)
because otherwise the correlations between Alice and Bob
could have originated from a separable state [7]. Here,
the excess noise δ is determined via homodyne measure-
ments. It can easily be verified that our calculated lower
bounds on the secret key rate for the various types of
protocols are well in the regime of quantum correlations.
In this article, we compare different approaches to dis-
till a key for a CV prepare-and-measure scheme. We as-
sume that the quantum channel between Alice and Bob
can be verified to be Gaussian through tomographic com-
2plete measurements and that Eve is restricted to collec-
tive attacks. While the observation of a Gaussian chan-
nel is certainly a restriction, it should be noted that this
scenario is typically encountered in practise. Moreover,
recent work [24, 25] indicates that the Gaussian attack
might be optimal for the non-postselected protocols con-
sidered here. However, it is still an open problem to re-
late this result to protocols including announcements and
postselection. Furthermore, there is hope to find a quan-
tum de Finetti like argument [26] valid in the regime of
continuous variables to extend the security against collec-
tive attacks to unconditional security, as this can already
be done in finite dimensions. Since we are only interested
in the key rate in the asymptotic limit, we do not con-
sider any finite size effects in our analysis. A complete
security proof would have to resolve these issues.
We consider a protocol where Alice uses coherent states
as signals and send through Eve’s domain to Bob, who
performs a heterodyne measurement onto the received
states. It is known that one can improve the secret key
rate if one introduces reverse reconciliation (RR) [1, 8].
This means that Bob decides on a raw key based upon his
measurement results and consequently sends Alice cor-
rection information over the public channel in the error
correction step of the protocol. Another way to improve
the performance of the protocol is to employ postselec-
tion (PS)[14]: Bob only retains measurement outcomes
that are closely correlated to Alice in order to gain some
advantage over Eve. This approach can lead to positive
secret key rates for direct reconciliation (DR) schemes
beyond the so called 3dB loss limit [27]. Since both ap-
proaches are not mutual exclusive, we consider combina-
tions of DR and RR with PS. If one takes a realistic error
correction protocol into account, it has been shown that
it is necessary to introduce a postselection step in the
RR protocols to retrieve the initial advantage that RR
has over DR [28].
This article is organized as follows. In Sec. II we in-
troduce the QKD protocol under investigation. Then
we describe the state distribution scheme in an entan-
glement based scheme. The fact that state distribution
in our protocol can be seen as Alice and Bob perform-
ing tomographic complete measurements lets us restrict
Eve’s knowledge about the signals. This is applied to the
Gaussian noisy channel in the next section. In Sec. V
we modify our protocol and let Alice and Bob partially
announce their measurement outcomes. This defines in-
dependent effective binary channels. Next, we calculate
a lower bound on the secret key rate for each binary
channel independently. The last section contains the nu-
merical optimized secret key rates and our conclusion.
II. THE PROTOCOL
We consider a prepare-and-measure scheme where Al-
ice encodes her bit value into the modulation of co-
herent states |α〉 as signals. The complex amplitude
α = αx + iαy is chosen at random according to a sym-
metric Gaussian probability distribution
p(α) =
1
2πκ
e−
|α|2
2κ , (2)
centered around the origin. Alice’s assigns her signal the
bit value 0 (1) if the real part of the sent amplitude αx is
positive (negative). The states |α〉 are then sent through
Eve’s domain to Bob. Bob performs a heterodyne mea-
surement on the received states ραB, which is mathemat-
ically equivalent to a projection onto a coherent state
|β〉 = |βx + iβy〉. He obtains the measurement outcome
β with probability
p(β|α) = 1
π
〈β|ραB |β〉 (3)
and assigns a bit value 0 (1) whenever his measurement
outcome βx is positive (negative).
After Bob has measured out the received states, Alice
announces partially the amplitude of the sent signals as
a = {|αx|, αy} and Bob announces respectively partially
his measurement outcome as b = {|βx|, βy}. As we will
see in Sec. V, this announcement will enable us to de-
compose the problem into effective independent binary
channels.
III. REPLACEMENT OF THE SOURCE AND
COMPLETE TOMOGRAPHIC MEASUREMENTS
The starting point of our analysis is that we rephrase
the state preparation step in the prepare-and-measure
setup in an entanglement based way. This can be done by
supplying Alice with a suitable source of entangled states.
One part of the entangled state is kept by Alice whereas
the other part is sent through the quantum channel to
Bob. This scheme is a valid description of the prepare-
and-measure scheme, if a measurement performed by Al-
ice onto her part of the entangled state effectively pre-
pares the desired conditional state of the prepare-and-
measure scheme with the proper a priori probabilities.
As we show later, this can be done for the protocol in-
troduced in the previous section. Moreover, both mea-
surements performed by Alice and Bob turn out to be
tomographical complete in our case.
After preparing n entangled states, Alice and Bob
share the state ρ⊗nAB, since we restrict Eve to collective
attacks. Without loss of generality one can assume that
ρAB originates from a pure three party state |ΨABE〉.
Eve holds the purifying environment ρE of ρAB which
summarizes her knowledge about the distributed states.
As we restrict ourselves to the case when both mea-
surements performed by Alice and Bob are tomographic
complete, they can in principle reconstruct their shared
state ρAB. However, we skip details of the tomography
in our analysis as we are only interested in evaluating
the secret key rate in the asymptotic limit as n → ∞.
Therefore, the security analysis presented here can be
3considered as incomplete. The aim is to investigate what
the rate one can expect to find assuming that one solves
the additional steps involving the estimate of the state
shared by Alice and Bob.
From the purity of state |ΨABE〉 it follows from
Schmidt’s decomposition that ρAB = trE |ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |
and ρE = trAB|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE | have the same eigenval-
ues. Eve’s reduced density matrix ρE is then determined
up to an arbitrary unitary operation on her system by
the state tomography. This in turn completely deter-
mines Eve’s knowledge about the distributed signals.
In the following we apply this kind of analysis to our
protocol from Sec. II in a realistic scenario.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE GAUSSIAN
CHANNEL
It has been shown by Grosshans et al. [8] that Al-
ice’s state preparation can formally be described in an
entanglement based scheme. It corresponds to a situa-
tion where Alice has a source under her control that pro-
duces two-mode squeezed states |ξAB′〉. If Alice performs
a heterodyne measurement onto her part of the state,
she effectively prepares a coherent state in the B′ system
with Gaussian a priori probability. As the source of two-
mode squeezed states is under her control, she can choose
a suitable squeezing parameter so that she indeed effec-
tively prepares coherent states with the proper a priori
probability (2). The part B′ of the state is then passed to
Bob through Eve’s domain. Bob performs a heterodyne
measurement on the received state. Since this measure-
ment is tomographical complete, we can directly apply
the reasoning of the last section to this specific protocol
and obtain the state in Eve’s hand.
For the state tomography step, it is worth noting that
Alice’s reduced density matrix ρA = trρAB is fixed by
preparing coherent states |α〉 with the a priori probabil-
ities given by Eq. (2). One can therefore parameterize
Alice’s subsystem by the variance κ of the probability
distribution p(α). Moreover, it suffices to check the con-
ditional states ραB to estimate Eve’s interference with the
signals. However, we do not consider arbitrary noise im-
posed by Eve on the conditional states, but limit our
security analysis to a scenario which is typically encoun-
tered in experiments: we assume that the states Bob re-
ceives are attenuated by the loss η in the quantum chan-
nel and the conditional probability distributions p(β|α)
as given by Eq. (3) still have Gaussian form but are
broadened by a factor
δ = 2
(
∆2obsβx
∆2vacβx
− 1
)
, (4)
the so called excess noise. Here, ∆2obsβx denotes the ob-
served variance of the classical probability distribution
(3) and ∆2vacβx is the corresponding variance of the vac-
uum. We have included the factor 2 so that our definition
of the excess noise matches the one given in Ref. [7] via
quadrature-‘ measurements. The quadrature operator xˆ
is defined as xˆ = 1√
2
(aˆ + aˆ†), where aˆ and aˆ† is the
photon annihilation and creation operator. As a further
assumption, we suppose that the channel adds the same
amount of noise in both quadratures, so that Bob effec-
tively verifies that he receives displaced thermal states as
conditional states, denoted by ραB. Then the probability
of Bob getting the measurement outcome β conditioned
on Alice sending a coherent state with amplitude α is
given by Eq. (3) as
p(β|α) = 2
π(2 + δ)
e−
2|β−√ηα|2
2+δ . (5)
Since Bob’s subsystem can be characterized by the esti-
mated channel parameters, the total bipartite state ρAB
is given by the input variance κ, the excess noise δ and
the loss η. As mentioned before, the knowledge ρAB
determines Eve’s quantum state ρE up to an arbitrary
unitary operation on her system when complete tomo-
graphic measurements are available. It then follows that
Eve’s knowledge about the signals is fixed by the set of
parameters κ, η and δ. Therefore, all attacks performed
by Eve give her exactly the same amount of information
about the signals as long as the channel can be verified to
be Gaussian. In particular, this means that attacks like
the entangling cloner [8] or the amplifier attack [9, 15]
are equivalent in this setting and Eve retains the whole
purifying environment. Recent results concerning the op-
timality of Gaussian attacks, when the full tomographic
information is not available, can be found in [24, 25].
Here one can pick a specific attack to construct Eve’s
ancilla system ρE , which is only restricted in the sense
that the conditional states ραB that Bob receives are ther-
mal states and Eve retains the whole purifying environ-
ment of ραB. On the other hand, the joint probability dis-
tribution p(α, β) of Alice preparing an input state with
amplitude α and Bob obtaining a measurement outcome
β is fixed by the state tomography. It follows that Eve’s
conditional states |ǫα,β〉 already contain all her knowl-
edge about the distributed signals. These states are pure,
since they can be thought of originating from a projec-
tion measurement of the pure three party state |ΨABE〉.
Equivalently, Eve’s information can also summarized in
the matrix of all possible overlaps 〈ǫα,β |ǫα′,β′〉.
We will proceed to calculate a lower bound on the se-
cret key rate with the specified discretisation to bit-values
of continuous outcomes β and α. It turns out that in this
case Eve will effectively have to distinguish non-Gaussian
states on an infinite dimensional Hilbert space to infer the
bit-value. Since this is hard to solve in general, we ap-
ply an approach to define effective binary channels as we
have already done in [28] and let Alice and Bob partially
announce α and β. This partial knowledge will become
available to Eve, who then only needs to distinguish two
nonorthogonal states on a two dimensional Hilbert space,
so that we can evaluate easily all related quantities.
4V. EFFECTIVE BINARY CHANNELS
The security analysis presented here is limited to the
collective attack scenario, so that the bipartite state be-
tween Alice and Bob after n uses of the quantum chan-
nel is simply ρ⊗nAB. Consequently, Bob’s measurement
outcomes β on subsequent signals are independent. Sup-
pose now that Alice announces the modulus of the real
part |αx| and the imaginary part αy of the prepared am-
plitude α = αx + iαy. Now Bob knows that the state he
receives can only originate from the two possible states
|±|αx|+ iαy〉 and that in each distributed state one bit
of classical information is encoded. Each distribution of
a signal between Alice and Bob corresponds to the use of
an effective binary channel defined by Alice’s announce-
ment and Bob’s measurement. From Eq. (2) follows that
both possible input states occur with equal probability.
The probability of Alice making a certain announcement
a = {|αx|, αy} can be directly calculated form Eq. (2) as
p(a) = p(+|αx|+ iαy) + p(−|αx|+ iαy)
= 2p(|αx|+ iαy) = 1
πκ
e−
|a|2
2κ . (6)
Bob performs a heterodyne measurement on the received
state. The probability that he gets the measurement out-
come β after the announcement of Alice can be calculated
from Eq. (5) as
p(β|a) = p(β|a, 0)p(a, 0) + p(β|a, 1)p(a, 1)
p(a, 0) + p(a, 1)
=
1
2
(p(β|a, 0) + p(β|a, 1)) , (7)
where we have characterized the two possible values for
the amplitude α = ±|αx|+ iαy by the encoded bit-value
0 or 1 and the announcement a. The conditional prob-
abilities for Bob obtaining the measurement result β for
given announcement a are directly given by (5) as
p(β|a, 0) = 2
π (2 + δ)
e
−2
„
(βx−√η|αx|)2+(βy−√ηαy)2
2+δ
«
(8)
p(β|a, 1) = 2
π (2 + δ)
e
−2
„
(βx+
√
η|αx|)2+(βy−√ηαy)2
2+δ
«
.
Similar to the announcement of Alice, we let Bob record
the measured β for each signal and publicly announce
b = {|βx|, βy}. From Eq. (7) follows that
p(+|βx|+ iβy|a) = p(−|βx|+ iβy|a) ,
so that the probability for Bob making an announcement
b given Alice announced a is
p(b|a) = 2p(+|βx|+ iβy|a). (9)
Both announcements of Alice and Bob for a given dis-
tributed state will then define one effective binary chan-
nel. Furthermore, the error probability for Bob assigning
the wrong bit-value can be computed from (8) as
e+ =
p(b,+|a, 1)
p(b,+|a, 0) + p(b,+|a, 1) , (10)
where we have chosen to describe Bob’s measurement
outcome β by the announcement b and the sign of the
measured βx, which corresponds to Bob’s decision on a
bit-value. Respectively the error probability e− when he
obtained a negative sign for the measured βx is given by
e− =
p(b,−|a, 0)
p(b,−|a, 0) + p(b,−|a, 1) . (11)
From Eq. (5) follows that each effective binary channel
defined by the announcements of a and b is symmetric in
the error rate, since
e+ = e− ≡ e ≡ e(|αx|, |βx|) = 1
1 + e
8
√
η|αx||βx|
2+δ
(12)
holds. Each distributed state between Alice and Bob
with announced a and b therefore corresponds to the use
of an effective symmetric binary channel with error rate
e as given by (12). Each information channel contributes
an amount of 1−Hbin to the mutual information between
Alice and Bob, whereas Hbin is the entropy of a binary
symmetric channel,
Hbin(e) = −e log2(e)− (1 − e) log2(1− e). (13)
The total mutual information between Alice and Bob
IA:B can be calculated as a sum over all effective binary
channels weighted with the appropriate probabilities (6)
and (9) as
IA:B =
∫ ∞
0
d|αx|
∫ ∞
−∞
dαy p(a)× (14)
×
∫ ∞
0
d|βx|
∫ ∞
−∞
dβy p(b|a)
[
1−Hbin (e)] .
Since the error rate e only depends on the announced
values of |βx| and |αx| one can carry out parts of the
integration analytically to simplify (14) as
IA:B =
∫ ∞
0
d|αx| p(|αx|)× (15)
×
∫ ∞
0
d|βx| p
(|βx|∣∣|αx|) [1−Hbin (e)] .
The total probability p(|βx|||αx|) that Bob announces a
particular value |βx| for a given announcement a of Alice
can be derived from (7) and (8) as
p
(|βx|∣∣|αx|) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dβy p(b|a) (16)
=
√
2
π (2 + δ)
(
e−
2(|βx|+√η|αx|)2
2+δ + e−
2(|βx|−√η|αx|)2
2+δ
)
5and the probability that Alice announces |αx| follows
from (6) as
p(|αx|) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dαyp(a) =
√
2
πκ
e−
|αx|2
2κ . (17)
We have now quantified the mutual information between
Alice and Bob. As mentioned before, Eve’s information
about the signals is summarized in holding conditional
quantum states |ǫα,β〉. The announced values of a and b
give her partial information about the distributed signals.
In particular, she knows the effective binary channel that
has been used by Alice and Bob and the error rate e of
that channel. In other words, Eve knows for a given an-
nouncement of a and b that she holds a convex combina-
tion of the four possible states |ǫa,b0,+〉, |ǫa,b0,−〉, |ǫa,b1,+〉, |ǫa,b1,−〉
in her ancilla system, where 0 (1) corresponds to an en-
coded bit-value 0 (1) by Alice and + (−) to Bob obtaining
a positive (negative) measurement outcome for βx. The
state ǫa,b that Eve holds for a given announcement {a, b}
can thus be written as
ǫa,b =
1
2
[
(1 − e)
(
|ǫa,b0,+〉〈ǫa,b0,+|+ |ǫa,b1,−〉〈ǫa,b1,−|
)
+e
(
|ǫa,b0,−〉〈ǫa,b0,−|+ |ǫa,b1,+〉〈ǫa,b1,+|
)]
. (18)
The state ǫa,b can be interpreted as a uniform mixture of
states corresponding to different encoded bit-values
ǫa,b =
1
2
(
ǫ
a,b
0 + ǫ
a,b
1
)
, (19)
or as a uniform mixture of states corresponding to differ-
ent signs of the measured βx
ǫa,b =
1
2
(
ǫ
a,b
+ + ǫ
a,b
−
)
, (20)
with
ǫ
a,b
0 = (1− e)|ǫa,b0,+〉〈ǫa,b0,+|+ e|ǫa,b0,−〉〈ǫa,b0,−|
ǫ
a,b
1 = (1− e)|ǫa,b1,−〉〈ǫa,b1,−|+ e|ǫa,b1,+〉〈ǫa,b1,+|
ǫ
a,b
+ = (1− e)|ǫa,b0,+〉〈ǫa,b0,+|+ e|ǫa,b1,+〉〈ǫa,b1,+|
ǫ
a,b
− = (1− e)|ǫa,b1,−〉〈ǫa,b1,−|+ e|ǫa,b0,−〉〈ǫa,b0,−| . (21)
If Eve wants to infer the encoded bit-value, she effectively
has to distinguish the states ǫa,b0 and ǫ
a,b
1 . This case is
common in QKD and we refer to it as direct reconciliation
(DR). As already mentioned, there exists an inequivalent
way to distill a key from exchanged quantum states in
CV-QKD: with the use of strict one-way communication
in the classical post-processing step of the protocol, one
can force Eve to infer Bob’s measurement outcome rather
than the encoded bit-value. This method is called reverse
reconciliation and was first pointed out by Grosshans [1,
8]. For the specific protocol investigated here this means
that Eve has to discriminate ǫa,b+ and ǫ
a,b
− for a given
effective binary channel in the RR schemes.
VI. LOWER BOUND ON SECRET KEY RATE
The aim of this article is to compute a achievable lower
bound on the secret key rate for our specified prepare-
and-measure QKD using coherent states. By now we
have shown that Eve’s knowledge about the distributed
signals, given a certain effective binary channel is used,
is summarized in the quantum states ǫa,b0 and ǫ
a,b
1 for the
DR schemes or ǫa,b+ and ǫ
a,b
− when RR is applied. In the
following, we use a result by Devetak and Winter [21],
which gives a lower bound on the secret key rate as a
function of the states that Eve has to distinguish. This
approach is valid in the collective attack scenario and
one-way classical post-processing. Then the secret key
rate G is bounded from below by
G ≥ IA:B − χ , (22)
with χ being Holevo’s quantity [29]. Since we investigate
a practical QKD scheme with a specified measurement
setup, we have replaced the Holevo quantity between Al-
ice and Bob in theorem (1) of [21] by the classical mutual
Information IA:B. The Holevo quantity χ is defined as
χ = S(ρ)−
1∑
i=0
piS(ρi) (23)
ρ =
1∑
i=0
piρi,
where S(ρ) = −tr (ρlog2ρ) denotes the von Neumann en-
tropy and the ρi are the states that Eve needs to distin-
guish. The announcements of a and b divide the state
distribution into independent binary channels. It follows
that we can apply the bound (23) to each effective bi-
nary channel defined by the announcement of a and b
separately. The contribution to the mutual information
between Alice and Bob per use of an effective binary
channel is 1−Hbin(e), where the binary entropy Hbin(e)
is given by Eq. (13). An upper bound for Eve’s informa-
tion about the signals for a given announcement can be
written according to Eq. (23) as
χ
a,b
DR = S(ǫ
a,b)− 1
2
[
S
(
ǫ
a,b
0
)
+ S
(
ǫ
a,b
1
)]
, (24)
when the key bit is determined by Alice’s encoding pro-
cedure as in the DR schemes or as
χ
a,b
RR = S(ǫ
a,b)− 1
2
[
S
(
ǫ
a,b
+
)
+ S
(
ǫ
a,b
−
)]
, (25)
when a RR scheme is applied. We have used that the
a priori probabilities pi =
1
2 in a given effective binary
channel for both RR and DR, as can be seen from Eqs.
(19) and (20). Hence we have to calculate the von Neu-
mann entropies of the states defined in Eqs. (18) and
(21) to bound Eve’s knowledge about the key. A lower
bound can then be obtained with the help of Eqs. (6),
6(9) and (13) by summing over all independent effective
binary channels as
G ≥
∫ ∞
0
d|αx|
∫ ∞
−∞
dαy p(a)
∫ ∞
0
d|βx|× (26)
×
∫ ∞
−∞
dβy p(b|a)
{[
1−Hbin (e)]− χa,b} ,
where the Holevo quantity χa,b is given by Eq. (24) in
the DR schemes and by Eq. (25) in the RR case. In the
following we will explicitly calculate the Holevo quanti-
ties for these two types of protocols for a lossy and noisy
Gaussian quantum channel.
VII. EVE’S INFORMATION
We have pointed out that all collective attacks that
Eve might perform on the distributed signals are uni-
tarily equivalent if the quantum channel between Alice
and Bob can be verified as being symmetric and Gaus-
sian, assuming that Eve retains the whole purifying en-
vironment. It is convenient to pick a specific attack with
these properties to estimate Eve’s knowledge about the
distributed signals. Here, we have chosen the entangling
cloner attack [8] to carry out the calculation. In this at-
tack, Eve taps off the signals sent by Alice with a beam-
splitter and feeds one half of a two mode squeezed state
in unused port of the beam-splitter. In doing so, the sig-
nals become attenuated according to the transmittivity
of the beam-splitter and she introduces Gaussian excess
noise on Bob’s side. The amount of squeezing she uses
in preparing her two mode squeezed state relates to the
excess noise seen by Bob. More specifically, the state
shared between Eve and Bob conditioned on Alice send-
ing a coherent state |α〉 can be constructed via
|ΨαB,E〉 = RˆB,E1(η)SˆE1,E2(ξ)|α〉B |0〉E1 |0〉E2 , (27)
with
RˆB,E1(θ) = e
θ
2
(eˆ1
†bˆ−bˆ†eˆ1) (28)
SˆE1,E2(ξ) = e
−ξeˆ1†eˆ2†+ξ∗eˆ2 eˆ1 ,
whereas E1, E2 label the modes in Eve’s hand, SˆE1,E2(ξ)
denotes the two-mode squeezing operator with squeez-
ing parameter ξ = reiφ as can be found, for example,
in Ref. [30]. The unitary RˆB,E1(θ) is associated to a
beam-splitter with transmittivity η via the identification√
η = cos( θ2 ). The operators bˆ, eˆ1 and eˆ2 are the bosonic
anihilation operators associated with the modes E1, E2
and B. From this, one can calculate Bob’s received states
by tracing out Eve’s subsystem. It is easy to see that from
Bob’s point of view Eve effectively injects a thermal state
in the beam-splitter so that Bob will observe Gaussian
noise. The amount of excess noise δ is related to the
squeezing parameter ξ = reiγ as δ = 2 sinh2r(1− η).
From Eq. (27), one can calculate Eve’s states |ǫα,β〉
conditioned on Alice sending a coherent state |α〉 and
Bob obtaining the measurement outcome β by projecting
|ΨαB,E〉 onto |β〉. As before, we relabel the state |ǫα,β〉 in
terms of the announcement {a, b}, the encoded bit-value
i ∈ {0, 1} and the sign of Bob’s measurement outcome
k ∈ {+,−} as |ǫa,bi,k 〉. Since Eve’s system is fixed up to
an arbitrary global unitary on her system by the tomog-
raphy step, it is sufficient to calculate the matrix of all
possible overlaps 〈ǫa,bi,k |ǫa,bj,l 〉 to estimate Eve’s knowledge.
It turns out that the overlaps can be written as
〈ǫa,bi,k |ǫa,bj,l 〉 = (29)
=


1 Be−iφ Aeiψ ABeiψ−iφ
Beiφ 1 ABeiψ+iφ Aeiψ
Ae−iψ ABe−iψ−iφ 1 BBe−iφ
ABe−iψ+iφ Ae−iψ Beiφ 1


(30)
with
A = e−(α
2
x(1− η1+δ )) (31)
B = e−(β
2
x
δ
1+δ ) .
One can get rid of the phase factors depending on φ and
ψ by multiplying the states |ǫa,bi,k 〉 by appropriate phase
factors. This is possible, since we are only interested in
the construction of states of the form
ρ =
∑
i,k
p(i, k)|ǫa,bi,k 〉〈ǫa,bi,k | , (32)
as can be seen from Eqs. (18) and (21). The states ρ are
obviously invariant under this transformation.
The matrix of overlaps (29) is then of the form
〈ǫa,bi,k |ǫa,bj,l 〉 =


1 B A AB
B 1 AB A
A AB 1 B
AB A B 1


=
(
1 A
A 1
)
⊗
(
1 B
B 1
)
. (33)
From that it follows that one can write the states |ǫa,bi,k 〉
as
|ǫa,bi,k 〉 = |ǫa,bi 〉|ǫa,bk 〉 (34)
with
〈ǫa,b0 |ǫa,b1 〉 = A = e−(α
2
x(1− η1+δ )) (35)
〈ǫa,b+ |ǫa,b− 〉 = B = e−(β
2
x
δ
1+δ ),
where we already replaced the squeezing parameter ξ by
the excess noise δ observed by Bob.
Since the states under investigation can be written as
a product (34) of two states in two dimensional Hilbert
7spaces, one can expand them as
|ǫa,b0 〉 = c0|Φ0〉+ c1|Φ1〉 (36)
|ǫa,b1 〉 = c0|Φ0〉 − c1|Φ1〉 (37)
and
|ǫa,b+ 〉 = c+|Φ+〉+ c−|Φ−〉 (38)
|ǫa,b− 〉 = c+|Φ+〉 − c−|Φ−〉 , (39)
where |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 form a set of orthonormal basis
states for the Hilbert space spanned by |ǫa,b0 〉 and |ǫa,b1 〉.
Respectively |Φ+〉 and |Φ−〉 form an orthogonal basis for
the space spanned by |ǫa,b+ 〉 and |ǫa,b− 〉. The coefficients
c0, c1, c+ and c− depend on the effective binary chan-
nel labeled by a and b, though we suppress these indices
now to simplify the notation. It is important, however,
to keep in mind that we estimate Eve’s knowledge about
the signals for each effective channel independently. The
normalization condition reads
|c0|2 + |c1|2 = |c+|2 + |c−|2 = 1. (40)
and
|c0|2 − |c1|2 = 〈ǫa,b0 |ǫa,b1 〉 = A (41)
|c+|2 − |c−|2 = 〈ǫa,b+ |ǫa,b− 〉 = B
is fixed by the overlaps (35). In this basis the state ǫa,b
of Eq. (18) can be written as
ǫa,b =


|c0|2|c+|2 0 0 (1− 2e)c0c∗1c+c∗−
0 |c0|2|c−|2 (1− 2e)c0c∗1c+c∗− 0
0 (1− 2e)c∗0c1c∗+c− |c1|2|c+|2 0
(1− 2e)c∗0c1c∗+c− 0 0 |c1|2|c−|2

 , (42)
which has the eigenvalues
λ1,2 =
1
2
[
|c0|2|c−|2 + |c1|2|c+|2 ±
√
(|c0|2|c−|2 + |c1|2|c+|2)2 − 16e(1− e)|c0|2|c−|2|c1|2|c+|2
]
(43)
λ3,4 =
1
2
[
|c0|2|c+|2 + |c1|2|c−|2 ±
√
(|c0|2|c+|2 + |c1|2|c−|2)2 − 16e(1− e)|c0|2|c−|2|c1|2|c+|2
]
,
so that we can calculate the first term of Eqs. (24) and
(25) with the help of Eqs. (43),(41),(40) and (35) via the
equation
S(ǫa,b) = −
∑
i
λilog2λi . (44)
The explicit expression is omitted here.
A. Direct reconciliation
In the DR protocols, Eve has to discriminate the states
ǫ
a,b
0 and ǫ
a,b
1 as defined in Eqs. (21) in order to infer the
bit-value encoded by Alice. These can be expressed in
product form (34) as
ǫ
a,b
0 = |ǫa,b0 〉〈ǫa,b0 | ⊗
[
(1− e)|ǫa,b+ 〉〈ǫa,b+ |+ e|ǫa,b− 〉〈ǫa,b− |
]
(45)
ǫ
a,b
1 = |ǫa,b1 〉〈ǫa,b1 | ⊗
[
(1− e)|ǫa,b− 〉〈ǫa,b− |+ e|ǫa,b+ 〉〈ǫa,b+ |
]
.
With the help of the basis states |Φ0〉, |Φ1〉 and |Φ+〉,
|Φ−〉 these states can be written as
ǫ
a,b
0 =
( |c0|2 c∗1c0
c∗0c1 |c1|2
)
⊗
( |c+|2 (1− 2e) c∗+c−
(1− 2e) c∗−c+ |c−|2
)
(46)
ǫ
a,b
1 =
( |c0|2 −c∗1c0
−c∗0c1 |c1|2
)
⊗
( |c+|2 − (1− 2e) c∗+c−
− (1− 2e) c∗−c+ |c−|2
)
.
It is easy to see that there exists a unitary U with ǫa,b0 =
Uǫ
a,b
1 U
†, so that S(ǫa,b0 ) = S(ǫ
a,b
1 ). The eigenvalues of
the state ǫa,b0 can be obtained by first diagonalizing the
8sub-matrices and then taking the tensor product. Then
ǫ
a,b
0 reads,
ǫ
a,b
0 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊗
(
λ01 0
0 λ02
)
(47)
in its eigenbasis. The eigenvalues λ01,2 are given by
λ01,2 =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 16e(1− e)(|c+|2 |c−|2)
)
. (48)
so that the entropy S(ǫa,b0 ) can be computed with the help
of Eqs. (12), (35), (41) and (48) and Eve’s knowledge
about the distributed signals in the DR protocol is upper
bounded by
χ
a,b
DR = S(ǫ
a,b)− S(ǫa,b0 ) , (49)
where again the explicit expression is omitted.
B. Reverse reconciliation
In the RR schemes, the key bits are determined by the
sign of Bob’s measured βx component. Hence, Eve has to
discriminate the corresponding states ǫa,b+ and ǫ
a,b
− (21)
for a given effective binary channel. These can be written
with the help of Eq. (34) as
ǫ
a,b
+ = |ǫa,b+ 〉〈ǫa,b+ | ⊗
[
(1− e)|ǫa,b0 〉〈ǫa,b0 |+ e|ǫa,b1 〉〈ǫa,b1 |
]
(50)
ǫ
a,b
− = |ǫa,b− 〉〈ǫa,b− | ⊗
[
(1− e)|ǫa,b1 〉〈ǫa,b1 |+ e|ǫa,b0 〉〈ǫa,b0 |
]
.
In the |Φ0〉, |Φ1〉 and |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉basis, these states read
ǫ
a,b
+ =
( |c+|2 c∗−c+
c∗+c− |c+|2
)
⊗
( |c0|2 (1− 2e) c∗0c1
(1− 2e) c∗1c0 |c1|2
)
(51)
ǫ
a,b
− =
( |c+|2 −c∗−c+
−c∗+c− |c−|2
)
⊗
( |c0|2 − (1− 2e) c∗0c1
− (1− 2e) c∗1c0 |c1|2
)
.
Similar as in the previous subsection, the states ǫa,b+ and
ǫ
a,b
+ are unitarily equivalent, so that it suffices to calcu-
late S(ǫa,b+ ) to determine the upper bound (25) of Eve’s
information about the signals for the RR protocols. The
eigenvalues λ+1,2 of ǫ
a,b
+ turn out to be
λ+1,2 =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 16e(1− e)(|c0|2 |c1|2)
)
, (52)
so that we can easily estimate Eve’s knowledge about the
distributed states with the help of Eqs. (52)and (44) as
χ
a,b
RR = S(ǫ
a,b)− S(ǫa,b+ ) . (53)
VIII. SECRET KEY RATE AND
POSTSELECTION
By now, we have calculated the individual terms of an
upper bound χa,b on Eve’s information about the raw
key for DR and for RR protocols, given that an effective
information channel is used. We have also shown that
the mutual information shared between the two honest
parties per effective binary channel labeled by the an-
nouncement of a and b is given by 1 − Hbin, with Hbin
being the entropy of a symmetric binary channel (13).
The total secret key rate can thus be calculated as a sum
over all binary channels according to Eq. (26). Since
neither the mutual information (1−Hbin) between Alice
and Bob nor Eve’s information χa,b depend on the an-
nounced values of αy and βy, one can simplify Eq. (26)
as
G ≥
∫ ∞
0
d|αx| p(|αx|)
∫ ∞
0
d|βx| p(|βx|
∣∣|αx|)×
× [1−Hbin (e)− χa,b]
=
∫ ∞
0
d|αx| p(|αx|)
∫ ∞
0
d|βx| p(|βx|
∣∣|αx|)∆I(a, b) ,
(54)
where the probabilities p(|αx|) and p(|βx|
∣∣|αx|) are given
by Eqs. (17) and (16).
The term ∆I(a, b) quantifies the average information
theoretic advantage of Alice and Bob over Eve for a given
effective channel. Since we have calculated this quantity
for all channels separately, we can improve the perfor-
mance of the protocols by dismissing effective channels
whenever ∆I(a, b) is negative and hence Eve knows more
about the distributed signals than Alice and Bob. This
procedure is called postselection. Even in absence of
noise, a postselection procedure is for example necessary
to lead to a positive secret key rate beyond 3 dB losses for
9FIG. 1: Optimal values for the input variance κ vs. loss
1 − η for various protocols. All graphs shown correspond to
an excess noise δ of 2%.
the DR protocols [2]. For RR schemes, all effective binary
channels contribute a positive amount to the secret key
rate, if one only takes losses in the quantum channel into
account [28]. In this scenario, postselecting the measure-
ment outcomes cannot improve the secret key rate. This
is however no longer true if the channel imposes excess
noise δ on the signals, so that postselection can improve
the performance of the RR schemes in this more general
setting.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Now we have everything at hand to evaluate the secret
key rate G numerically. For a given excess noise δ and
transmission η we can optimize the input variance κ for
best performance. Optimal values for the input variance
κ are given in Fig. (1). For numerical purposes, we
restrict ourselves to vary the variance κ between 0.1 and
3. The optimal variance κ diverges in the limit η → 1.
Apart from that, the optimal variances fall well inside
the region in which we optimize κ.
Fig. (2) shows our results for the RR and the
postselected DR scheme. As expected, the secret key
rate G decreases with increasing excess noise δ =
{0, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1}. However, the noise affects
the non-postselected RR scheme much stronger than
the postselected DR scheme (PS-DR). The RR protocol
looses most of its initial advantage even for a low excess
noise of 2 %. This can be counteracted by introducing
a postselection step in the RR protocols, as proposed in
[28].
After introducing a postselection step in the RR
scheme (PS-RR), the protocol performs more robustly
against increasing excess noise δ, as can be seen in Fig.
(3). Now the PS-RR scheme performs better than the
FIG. 2: Comparison of the secret key rate G versus loss 1− η
for the PS-DR (dashed lines) and the RR (solid lines) scheme.
The secret key rates shown correspond to an excess noise δ
of {0, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1} and decrease with increasing
excess noise.
FIG. 3: Combination of postselection and reverse recon-
ciliation. Secret key rates G are plotted for the PS-DR
(dashed lines) and the PS-RR (solid lines) protocols and ver-
sus the channel loss 1 − η. The excess noise δ varies as
δ = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}.
DR counterpart for all values of the excess noise, though
the behavior of the secret rate gets more and more similar
for increasing excess noise. This shows again that it is ad-
vantageous to combine postselection with reverse recon-
ciliation for best performance in the presence of Gaussian
noisy quantum channels. However, here we assume that
all observed excess noise occurs in the quantum channel
and can therefore be exploited by Eve. As a benchmark,
one can tolerate an excess noise of about δ = 0.2 if the
quantum channel has 50% transmittivity. It follows that
the applicability of the protocols is very limited with this
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conservative assumption.
A. Two-way communication
The security analysis presented here assumes that the
communication between Alice and Bob in the classical
post-processing step is strictly one-way. From a practi-
cal point of view however, it is favorable to give lower
bounds to the secret key rate G for two-way communi-
cation, since these kind of protocols can easily be im-
plemented with known error correction procedures like
CASCADE. In principle, the bound (22) requires one-
way communication to be used. This can be circum-
vented however, if one reveals all information to Eve that
is in principle obtainable by an eavesdropper when two-
way classical post-processing is used. Following earlier
treatment in Ref. [31], one can assume for two-way er-
ror correction the worst-case scenario in which the pre-
cise position of the errors in Bob’s data become publicly
known. Then it does not matter anymore, whether Alice
or whether Bob make subsequent announcements. Note
that in CASCADE, Bob’s announcements are completely
determined by the error position, and therefore no longer
need to be taken into account when calculating the cost
of error correction. Given this knowledge, Eve can up-
date the state ǫa,b (18) that summarizes her knowledge
about the distributed signals and the remaining commu-
nication can be chosen to be one-way. Then Eq. (22)
is again valid, but the states ǫa,b now include this addi-
tional information. It follows that Eve either holds the
state
ǫa,bno error =
1
2
(
|ǫa,b0,+〉〈ǫa,b0,+|+ |ǫa,b1,−〉〈ǫa,b1,−|
)
(55)
or
ǫa,berror =
1
2
(
|ǫa,b0,−〉〈ǫa,b0,−|+ |ǫa,b1,+〉〈ǫa,b1,+|
)
(56)
in her ancilla system. Obviously, the probability that an
error in the bit assignment occurs is given by e. It is then
easy to show that Eve’s information about the signals for
a given announcement (a, b) is bounded by
χ
a,b
2−way = eχ
a,b
error + (1− e)χa,bno error (57)
= eS
(
ǫa,berror
)
+ (1− e)S (ǫa,bno error) ,
whereas the second line follows from the fact that here
Eve has to distinguish pure states. Furthermore, since
ǫa,bno error and ǫ
a,b
error are unitarily equivalent, S
(
ǫa,berror
)
=
S
(
ǫa,bno error
)
and
χ
a,b
2−way = S
(
ǫa,berror
)
= S
(
ǫa,bno error
)
. (58)
The entropy S
(
ǫa,bno error
)
is given by the eigenvalues
λ
2−way
1,2 of ǫ
a,b
no error (55). It is straight forward to show
that these are given by
λ
2−way
1 = |c0|2|c−|2 + |c1|2|c+|2 (59)
λ
2−way
2 = |c0|2|c+|2 + |c1|2|c−|2
FIG. 4: Secret key rates G for postselected protocols and two-
way communication (solid lines) in comparison to the one-
way PS-DR protocol (dashed lines). The excess noise δ varies
between 0 and 0.1 as in Fig. (2). For δ = 0, the curve for
two-way communication coincides with the one for the PS-DR
protocol.
with |c0|2, |c−|2, |c1|2, |c+|2 implicitly given by Eqs.(40)
and (41).
Figure (4) shows our numerical results for the secret
key rate G with two-way communication in comparison
to the postselected DR results. If there is no channel
excess noise δ present, we recover our previous result
that the DR-PS rate coincides with the two-way rate [28].
Moreover it can be seen that the knowledge about the er-
ror positions does not improve Eve’s position significantly
in our analysis. Even in the presence of excess noise δ,
the DR-PS rate gives a good approximation to the two-
way bound. A practical implementation using two-way
error correction codes like CASCADE will therefore yield
a secret key rate close to the one-way DR-PS rate.
B. Practical error correction
We extend our analysis presented here to a more re-
alistic scenario and take the effect of a non-ideal error
correction procedure into account.
The key rate (54) gives the theoretical achievable key
rate if a perfect error correction procedure is available.
In practise however, error correction codes that work ex-
actly at this so called Shannon limit [32] are not known.
Realistic error correction codes, like CASCADE [33] work
close to that limit. This can be included by modifying
Eq. (54) as
G ≥
∫ ∞
0
d|αx| p(|αx|)
∫ ∞
0
d|βx| p(|βx|
∣∣|αx|)×
× [1− f(e)Hbin (e)− χa,b] , (60)
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e f(e)
0.01 1.16
0.05 1.16
0.1 1.22
0.15 1.32
TABLE I: Efficiency of Cascade [33] for different values of the
error rate e
FIG. 5: Secret key rates G for postselected protocols using
the two-way error correction scheme CASCADE (solid lines).
For comparison, key rates for the PS-RR protocol with one-
way codes, that are as efficient as CASCADE are also shown
(dashed lines). The excess noise δ varies between 0 and 0.1
as in Fig. (2).
where the function f(e) represents the efficiency of the
error correction procedure and is a function of the error
rate e. As a benchmark, we assume that the used error
correction is as efficient as CASCADE. For our numerical
evaluation, we therefore use a linear fit to the values given
in Table I. For two-way communication, Eve’s knowledge
χa,b in Eq. (60) is given by Eq. (58). Following this ap-
proach, we can give secret key rates which are attainable
with todays technology. Numerical results are shown in
Fig. (5).
Reverse reconciliation clearly requires one-way commu-
nication. On the other hand, developing practical and
efficient one-way codes is still work in progress. It is
therefore interesting to see how much secret key rate one
would gain if one applies a one-way code that is as ef-
ficient as CASCADE. This can easily computed via Eq.
(60) whereas χa,b is given by Eq. (49) for the DR protocol
or by Eq. (53) for the RR scheme.
Fig. (5) shows also a comparison between two-way
protocols and PS-RR. The error correction procedure is
assumed to have the same efficiency as CASCADE. It can
be seen that one-way PS-RR has a significant advantage
over the attainable two-way protocol only for very low
values of the channel excess noise δ. This indicates that
the development of efficient one-way codes, as currently
under investigation by several groups, will significantly
benefit RR protocols if the channel excess noise can be
assumed to be of the order of a few percent.
X. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have addressed security issues for a
CV-QKD scheme in a practical setting. It is important
to include a postselection procedure in both the RR and
DR schemes to ensure that the protocols perform robust
against Gaussian excess noise.
We have shown that a implementation using two-way
error correction yields a secret key rate close to the rate
of the one-way direct reconciled protocol. As the ex-
cess noise increases, the secret key rates for the one-way
direct or reverse reconciled protocols become more and
maore similar to the ones obtainable by two-way com-
munication. Finally, we compute the secret key rate for
a protocol that is readily implementable using the error
correction code CASCADE.
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